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Abstract
The community of Europe today is at a crossroads. Recent pressures, many of them
external, are severely testing the integrity of the European Union, as well as the longstanding regional cooperation. Widespread inconsistencies in national policies across
member states, especially with regards to economic culture and fiscal policy, have
presented the EU with an existential crisis.
My hypothesis is that successful regional integration in Europe, however gradual, was not
a spontaneous reaction to acute external pressures. Instead, I argue that successful
regional integration was the result of a shared vision and careful planning by policy
makers and negotiators, who never shied away from addressing lofty ideals even as they
attempted to resolve practical considerations.
I will select three historical cases that represent foundational moments in the genesis of
the modern European Union. These three cases are the Treaty of Paris (1951) that forged
the European Coal and Steel Community, the Treaty of Rome (1957) that established the
European Economic Community and finally the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) that called
for the establishment of the European Union.
I will employ a specific pattern in order to clearly and consistently analyze the cases
relying on reports, speeches and other documents that demonstrate policy thinking. Each
case study will focus on the agreement itself and how it addresses, historically and
theoretically, the shortcomings of the status quo. Finally, each successful case will be
"tested" according to a number of criteria for successful integration that I encountered in
the writings of Ernst Haas and Bela Belassa.
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The purpose of this exercise is to attempt to understand how European states were able,
through the efforts of their leaders, to ultimately sacrifice sovereignty in the name of
stability. It would be a stretch to suggest that these issues represent the gravest challenges
that have ever divided Europeans, and that the past has nothing to teach us about
contemporary conflict resolution. By studying the past, I will discern guidelines for
formulating policy to maintain the integration movement in Europe.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The community of Europe today is at a crossroads. For the last several decades, most of
Europe has been united culturally, economically and to a limited extent, politically,
through informal relationships and through formal institutions, most notably through the
European Union. However, recent pressures, many of them external, are severely testing
the integrity of the European Union, as well as the long-standing regional cooperation
that has dominated the continent since the end of the Second World War. With every
passing day, globalization is forcing European states to confront new challenges. From
Scandinavia to Greece, EU members are feeling the effects of military adventures in
Asia, refugees fleeing conflict in the Arab world and seeking asylum on European shores
by the millions, and a devastating world-wide financial crisis and global recession.
Widespread inconsistencies in national policies across member states, especially with
regards to economic culture and fiscal policy, have presented the EU with an existential
crisis.
Since WWII, European unity, particularly through EU membership, has ensured regional
cooperation and protected against competition and armed conflict. It was born with just
six member states in 1951 cooperating in specific industrial arenas. However, today’s
EU has swelled in size, counting 28 states in its ranks, and uniting Europe through all
sorts of common cultural and economic regimes, including commercial, customs and
monetary policy. It is impossible to predict if the EU will sacrifice either its own
principles or its own membership in order to save (or destroy) itself as member states
attempt to resolve the current crises. However, from examining the history of the EU,
particularly the previous milestones of successful integration, and then viewing these
4

milestones from different perspectives of integration theory, one might be able to distill
some insight into the principles that inspired Europe’s leaders to consistently choose the
path of cooperation over competition.
My hypothesis is that successful regional integration in Europe, however gradual, was not
a spontaneous reaction to acute external pressures. Instead, I argue that successful
regional integration was the result of a shared vision and careful planning by policy
makers and negotiators, who never shied away from addressing lofty ideals even as they
attempted to resolve practical considerations.
In order to support this hypothesis, I will argue that leaders negotiating successful
integration have demonstrated that they sought to balance long-term idealistic goals
alongside practical ones. I will select three historical cases that represent foundational
moments in the genesis of the modern European Union. These three cases are the Treaty
of Paris (1951) that forged the European Coal and Steel Community, the Treaty of Rome
(1957) that established the European Economic Community and finally the Treaty of
Maastricht (1992) that called for the establishment of the European Union. I select these
cases because they are characterized as economic agreements, each specifically building
on the earlier one. They are all progressive agreements in sequence, rendering each
previous one obsolete through a call for increasingly evolved policies.

Such

economically based cases are more useful for study than other integration agreements
(such as political or cultural), since we can trace a clear evolutionary path among related
agreements. Because economic agreements incorporate literal dollars and cents (or
perhaps euros, in our case), an easily identifiable quantitative aspect, the path to
integration is more easily discerned than in the case of political agreements, whose
5

vectors of integration may be more subjective or qualitative, depending on one's
perspective.
Each case is a clear example of successful integration. However, they were also preceded
by a number of failed or underwhelming attempts at integration or international policy
coordination in Europe. As these attempts are contrasted with each test case that takes
shape as a successful moment of integration, we might discern a consistent pattern of
behavior and diplomatic strategy that affected the positive outcome.
It is not enough to analyze these three cases and their political epochs from just an
historical angle. A theoretical analysis of the cases, from schools of both international
relations and integration theory, is necessary. A theoretical analysis is important not only
because these academic perspectives greatly influenced the fathers of successful
European integration, but also because they shine a light on where failed attempts at
integration fell short of their intended marks. In the successful cases of integration that I
encounter, policy making will be demonstrated through the use and analysis of speeches,
reports and other relevant public documents.
Outline
I will employ a specific pattern in order to clearly and consistently analyze the cases,
relying on reports, speeches, and other documents that demonstrate policy thinking. Part
one of each case study will begin with an historical and theoretical analysis of the status
quo preceding each treaty. What was the status of the political environment? What
regional and global forces were swirling and churning that led policy makers to pursue a
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course of integration? How did previous events fall short, skirt the issue or fail
completely, ultimately giving birth to the successful treaty?
The second part of each case study will focus on the successful agreement itself, how it is
worded, and how it directly addresses, historically and theoretically, the shortcomings of
the status quo. This section will also delve into the genesis of the agreements, touching
upon the personalities and political conditions that shaped the accord and maximized the
probability for a successful outcome, especially in contrast to previous failed attempts.
Finally, each successful case will be "tested" according to a number of criteria for
successful integration that I encountered in the writings of Ernst Haas and Bela Belassa.
These criteria will test for: originality; prescience; responsiveness; perspective; if the
treaty is forward-thinking; and finally if the treaty accounts for the global picture. Each of
these tests is "qualitative" in nature, though I have carefully defined each according to
Haas's own writings. Haas was one of the most prolific theoreticians of integration theory
in the post-war era, very active from the 1940s to the 1960s. Europe, and is best
remembered as a champion of the neo-functionalist school of integration theory.
Additionally, Haas had a front row seat to the process of European integration, observing
up-close the formation of the proto-EU institutions and an active participant at integration
conferences following World War II. Belassa observed and wrote about European
integration in the 1960s and 70s. He was most concerned with economic integration, and
states’ compliance with federal regulations and standards. Belassa identifies weak spots
and offers his policy recommendations to increase efficiency and coordination.
The purpose of this exercise is to attempt to understand how European states were able,
through the efforts of their leaders, to ultimately sacrifice sovereignty in the name of
7

stability. Although the crises over which today's EU member states are squabbling should
not be minimized in their importance, it would be a stretch to suggest that these issues
represent the gravest challenges that have ever divided Europeans, and that the past has
nothing to teach us about contemporary conflict resolution.
Methodology
Primary sources will play a key role in helping to frame the agreements, and include the
clues we need to sift out the impact of visionary leaders behind the scenes at the
negotiations. They fall mainly into two groups. The first consists the actual treaties
signed by members of the modern European Union. This will consist of the three main
treaties that headline each case study, as well as any relevant auxiliary agreements and
amendments. The second set of primary sources are those relevant writings that impacted
the negotiations and final agreements, penned by those visionary leaders and capable
diplomats. In each case, there is always a manifesto, public address or key position paper
that strongly influenced the final agreement. Each of these papers expresses an inspired
vision for a final agreement, written by a European national leader with a front row seat
to the negotiations, and representing a constituency with a large stake in a final
agreement.
With respect to the first case, Treaty of Paris (1951) establishing the European Coal and
Steel Community, of chief interest is the Schumann Declaration of 1950, a paper blessed
by the leaders of France and Germany spelling out a vision for a realistic and sustainable
union of major regional powers. In the second case, Treaty of Rome (1957), the visionary
foundation was laid in the Spaak Report of 1956, produced by an intergovernmental
committee exploring the possibility of further economic integration for European states.
8

In exploring the inspiration for the final case study, Treaty of Maastricht (1992)
establishing the European Union, I’ll examine the efforts and leadership of Jacques
Delors, whose commissions mapped out a political groundwork for lasting economic
federalism in Europe.
Secondary sources fall mainly into two categories, both which will provide a framework
of analysis for the primary sources and the cases. The first type of secondary source
refers to the political and economic theorists writing, mainly but not exclusively, as
firsthand witnesses to the phenomenon of modern European integration. Hailing mainly
from the Liberalist school, they provide the academic basis for how and when to identify
integration in international and regional systems, as well as the relevant definitions,
factors and impacts. Without these sources, it would be impossible to identify integration
phenomena. Major integration theorists such as Haas, Belassa, Cantori, Spiegel, in
addition to a number of other writers observe modern political history in Europe and
around the world, and comment on the forces and phenomena that impact political
systems, as nations' interest either align or diverge.
The second type of secondary sources includes those historians and journalists who
observed and researched the actual negotiations, correspondence and personalities that
affected European integration in each case. They provide historical context in which to
place the primary sources Without their input, there would be no frame of reference for
determining the forces and criteria that underlie the success of each case.
Further sources that do not fall within these strict categories include additional theorists
not writing specifically with regards to European integration, but perhaps in reference to
other broad relevant concepts, such as Liberalism, political psychology, types of
9

integration and international cooperation, and economics. Similarly, we may encounter
some additional sources that further contextualize the phenomenon of European
integration without referring specifically to the European experience. By incorporating
these auxiliary sources, we will have a better idea of what the past can tell us about
successful integration in Europe, and draw conclusions about what such cooperation
means for the future of the region and the global community.
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Chapter 2: Review of Literature
In light of my topic, a basic source that helps bridge historical and theoretical context for
the evolution of the modern EU is The Community of Europe by Derek W. Urwin.
Urwin’s book is subtitled “a history of European integration since 1945,” and, as such,
places special emphasis on the people and events that shaped the modern EU. Since it
encompasses both intergovernmental and sovereign institutions, the EU is a product of
decades of diplomacy executed and relationships preserved at the highest level. Urwin
focuses on these diplomats and policy makers, as well as their political environments, in
order to draw a trajectory of integration from the end of WWII to the present day. In a
sense, Urwin’s book utilizes an historical perspective to demonstrate theoretical
integration.1
As a complement to Urwin’s history is Europe in Question, by R.J. Harrison. While
Urwin details the specific circumstances of Europe’s path to unification, Harrison is
consumed by the theoretical questions that underlie the local integration movement, and
how these paradigmatic considerations should affect policy making. Harrison lays out the
different major integration theories that influenced the EU’s founding fathers, namely the
theories of Functionalism, Neo-functionalism and Federalism, and their specific roles as
players in the drama of European unification. At every step of unification, and throughout
my three cases, policy makers were not simply acting impulsively or in response to
immediate circumstances. They were all heavily steeped in both ideology and many years
of integration theory. Harrison focuses on this aspect, and is interested in actually

1

Derek W. Urwin, The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration Since 1945 (New York:
Longman, 1995).
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advising national policy with respect to integration by studying the influences of these
theories.2
My hypothesis is supported directly by a foundation of primary sources applicable to
each case. The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European
Integration is a reader compiled and edited by Brent F. Nelson and Alexander Stubb
that contains several helpful documents and academic papers.
Nelson & Stubb is the source of the text for the Schumann Declaration, a brief address
delivered in 1950 by French foreign minister Robert Schumann and heavily influenced
by Schumann’s advisor, Jean Monnet. The declaration is often seen as the metaphorical
olive branch accepted by the Germans from the French, triggering the process of
negotiation that led to organic integration among major European powers. The speech
lays out a foundation for France and Germany that addressed immediate practical
concerns while encouraging fundamental alignment of interests in the future. The
Schumann proposal, paired with the auspicious political conditions in the international
community, is in many ways the “Big Bang” moment for the politically and economically
united Europe that we know today. 3
As the Schumann Declaration is regarded as a critical point in European political history,
Jean Monnet is famous for being the main thinker behind Schumann’s statement, and
Nelson and Stubb even refer to him as the “father of Europe.” If the structures of the

2

R.J. Harrison, Europe in Question (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1974).
Robert Schumann, “ The Schumann Declaration,” in The European Union: Readings on the Theory and
Practice of European Integration, ed. Brent F. Nelson and Alexander Stubb (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne
Rienner, 2003).
3
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European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) underlie the modern European Union, and
the ECSC originated with the Schumann Declaration, and Monnet’s own vision birthed
the Schumann Declaration, then Monnet, indeed, deserves quite a bit of credit for the
successful unification that took hold in Europe over the decades. Nelson and Stubb
include a 1962 essay called A Ferment of Change in which Jean Monnet, near the end
of his life, reflects on the new regional institution that had since evolved into the
European Economic Community. Monnet gives his own perspective, an authorized
biography of sorts, on the challenges that are facing a free Europe and the way that
nations are banding together to meet them. As a good Functionalist, Monnet concludes
with a brief vision of the future of European integration, and the movement’s own
purpose within the grand scheme of civilization.4
Ernst Haas, in my research, appeared as one of the most prolific and influential
Neofunctionalist writers. His 1958 essay The Challenge of Regionalism was one of the
first I encountered. It thoroughly elucidates different political systems and challenges that
arise when states encounter each o
very aspect of integration, from political machinery to the economy to civil society.
What sort of issues bring states together in a regional system, and how is the system
changed by effective integration? How should ruling elites behave to retain the support of
their constituents and win over outsiders? What is the role of transnational interest
groups? What does a most stable society look like after integration? What might imperil
it? By providing a complete vision of what a united Europe both looks like and does not,

4

Jean Monnet, “ A Ferment of Change,” in The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of
European Integration, ed. Brent F. Nelson and Alexander Stubb (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2003).
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Haas’s essay provides a useful pamphlet for policy makers to reference as they strike a
deal on unification. In fact, a number of criteria for my “test” of a successful integration
treaty are derived from this essay. 5
While Haas wrote several very well-known papers on integration theory, a second essay
of his, International Integration: The European and Universal Process, from 1961,
also proved extremely useful in informing about the history and political expediency of
early European unification. While The Challenge of Regionalism, described above,
referred to Haas’s ideas of general integration “do’s and don’ts,” European and
Universal Integration (as it is sometimes known) looks back on the European Economic
Community and directly compares the European experience of integration with other
existing intergovernmental unions. Haas examines the institutions and methods of these
other organizations in comparison to the EEC, and determines the way that the
organizations differ from each other, generally falling short in efficacy and scope. Haas
actually derives what he calls “lessons” from his research that ultimately serve to
distinguish, on paper, the EEC from other international organizations. Finally, and
maybe most interestingly, Haas attempts to apply his lessons of European unification to
other parts of the globe, such as the Americas, Asia and the Soviet Union, in order to
predict the trajectories of their respective regional systems. 6

5

Ernst B Haas, "The Challenge of Regionalism." International Organization 12.4 (1958): 440-58. JSTOR.
Web. 28 Sept. 2012. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/2704567?ref=searchgateway:9163c649966c85f8f0ee14ad44d27c94>.
6 Ernst B Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process." International
Organization 15.3 (1961): 366-92. JSTOR. Web. 28 Sept. 2012.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/2705338?ref=searchgateway:ec65e6f79ed32c51cb1e88a1869fdf80>.
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Although I encountered a number of economic and political theorists in my research,
another personality that stood out among the others was Bela Belassa. Belassa observes
the economic machinery of the European Economic Community in the 1960s and 1970s,
and derives his own ideas and theories about the problems and purposes of regional
integration. In 1973, Belassa wrote Regional Policies and the Environment in the
European Common Market. By “environment” here, Belassa refers to the economic
conditions both within each member state and also across the regional union. He observes
how member states fail to live up to their commitments of respecting regional economic
policy, and examines how these policies affect domestic populations and prices, as well
as their impact abroad. Belassa goes on to critique existing regional institutions, praising
them where he sees merit and mentioning where they fall short. Finally, he recommends
measures to strengthen the common market, through better policies at the federal level
and promoting compliance and responsibility to good governance among member states. 7
The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond by Walter Mattli is another
text that maps a theoretical approach to integration, using modern European history as a
backdrop. Mattli writes about the specific impact of integration theories on the European
continent, but paying special attention to the economic considerations of the evolution of
the EU. After extensively covering European integration, Mattli applies theories of
integration to other regional organizations in different geographic and historical settings. 8

7

Bela Belassa, "Regional Policies and the Environment in the European Common Market,"
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv Bd. 109 (1973): 402-17. JSTOR. Web. 17 Oct. 2012.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/40437694?ref=searchgateway:fa73d9c83f565168bf6ec7276c335e3e>.
8 Walter Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond (New York: Cambridge, 1999).
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France and Germany at Maastricht: Politics and Negotiations to Create the European
Union by Colette Mazucelli is a detailed account of what went on behind the scenes
between Europe’s two most important powers on the eve of the formation of the
European Union in 1992. In 1950, Schumann stated loud and clear the objectives, ideals
and aims of an accord between France and Germany. However, the political landscape
and regional institutions at stake in 1992 were far more mature and complex as compared
to those of Schumann and Adenauer. Mazucelli’s history, that begins with the conditions
predating Maastricht and then covers pre-negotiations, and finally ends with the
ratification processes in France and Germany, brings to light the challenges, interests, and
effects of the agreement. By focusing on the two sides of the debate, those of France and
Germany, as well as recounting the numerous gullies and bridges between them, a clear
picture of the successful negotiation, in spite of the various challenges, can take shape. 9
“And Still it Moves!” State Interests and Social Forces in the European Community
by Linda Cornett and James A. Caporaso appears in Chapter 8 in Governance without
Government: Order and Change in World Politics, edited by James Rosenau and ErnstOtto Czempiel. Cornett and Caporaso, in their paper, deliver a detailed view of the
history of European integration, from the 1950s to the 1990s, through a lens of both
economic and political theory. The benefit to Cornett’s and Caporaso’s approach is, just
as the title suggests, that it very clearly lays out the interests of states and actors in
Europe, as well as to how they reacted to stimuli in the system, at different points in the
process of integration. Cornett and Caporaso lay a thick blanket of theory over the

9

Colette Mazucelli, France and Germany at Maastricht: Politics and Negotiations to Create the European
Union (New York: Routledge, 2009).
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historical narrative. It seems that their insights could be especially useful as policy
makers consider contemporary actors and member states in Europe, and how they might
react and respond when exposed to different pressures.10
Reflecting on the overall phenomenon of unification in Europe still inspires reams
literature and validates idealistic proponents of cooperation and peace. It is a living
tribute to the idea that even the most intransigent political squabbles are temporal, and
that suspicion and selfishness are not the most prudent paths to security and prosperity.
This paper will not resolve the age-old issue of whether cooperation or competition are
the best approaches to international relations. However, it will draw on the above
sources, as well as various other works of historical and theoretical literature, in order to
glean lessons of the past and decant guidelines for today’s policy makers who seek to
preserve the European Union.

10

Linda Cornett and James A. Caporaso, “ ”And Still It Moves!” State Interests and Social Forces in the
European Community,” in Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, ed.
James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (New York: Cambridge University, 1992).
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Analysis
Analysis and application of theory to various historical scenarios, and the three cases of
this paper in particular, are critical if we can hope to learn what past experience says
about contemporary policy making. In my research, I noticed a beautiful and expedient
symmetry with regard to my cases and their theoretical underpinnings. There are three
dominant theories of international relations that correspond rather eloquently with respect
to each of our three cases. Moreover, three paradigms of integration theory also
correspond to these cases: The Treaty of Paris (1951) establishing the ECSC, the Treaty
of Rome (1957) establishing the EEC, and the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) establishing
the European Union.
Theories of international relations
Integration, coordination of interests and competition, as phenomena that describe the
dynamic relationships between states and governments, can be viewed through the lenses
of the main schools of international relations theory. Most relevant for this thesis are the
perspectives of Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism. Each of these three paradigms
adds to the understanding of integration in the three cases.
The Realist school best describes how states relate to each other in an environment of
anarchy, in the absence of competent or effective global government. In order to survive,
states and their leaders are required to always act selfishly, since power and security in
the international community is essentially a zero-sum game. A state that compromises
through an alliance with another state surrenders some sovereignty in return for an
equally realized gain. Since there are only absolute gains in this system, a state must
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benefit disproportionately to all others with respect to any international agreement, if they
are to realize any advantage. Otherwise, its security and prospects are inherently
diminished.11 It should be noted that “balance of power” is also a dynamic aspect of
Realist theory, as competing states seek stability through matching each other’s
capabilities.12 Although a Realist perspective might rule out the possibility of equitable
integration, considering this angle helps explain how inherently skeptical leaders can
form a trade-off with other states if it is to their advantage.
The Realist perspective is most beneficial for framing the European environment in the
inherently uncertain security situation of the 1940s and 1950s. At this time, the embers of
the bygone Second World War were still smoldering, economic recovery was still in its
infancy, and vast populations across the continent were still living under occupation,
rationing and other policies of scarcity. Furthermore, the Cold War was coming into
view, casting a long shadow of uncertainty over the international system. Mistrust and
suspicion ruled the day, as vast security and economic alliances set West against East.
The Liberal school of political theory is often seen as a direct foil to Realism, as it
generally assumes the same anarchic system and therefore the selfish motivations of
states.

However, Liberal thinkers believe that the international system represents a

positive-sum game as opposed to the zero-sum game of the Realist school. According to
Liberals, although states in the international system always act purely out of self-interest,
they can indeed cooperate in certain configurations to transcend the uncertainty of
competition. This means that it is possible for two states to align interests in such a way

11

Jack Donnelly, “Realism,” in Theories of International Relations (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan,
2009), page 39.
12 Ibid., page 37.
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that they both come out ahead, with each party objectively gaining in power and prestige
from the agreement, though perhaps not equally. In such an arrangement, a self-interested
state is only seeking gains that are relative to its partners and rivals, and not absolutely
with respect to the system. Naturally, Liberal thinkers play an important role in
integration theory, since Liberalism explains the ways that states can appropriately
coordinate and join together in order to achieve optimal outcomes for the system and
benefit all parties. A strict Realist, by contrast, might insist that there is no possible
outcome to cooperation in which all states will benefit. From the Realist’s perspective,
any realized gains must be directly accounted for by deficiencies from at least one state in
the agreement.
The ECSC of 1951 was a rigid agreement that cemented cooperation among member
states in very specific realms.

However, I believe that my second case, the Treaty of

Rome (1957), as well as the ultimate institutionalization of its European Economic
Community, is symbolic of the triumph of collaborative Liberalism over cold suspicious
Realism in the region. It was in the era of 1960s and 1970s, when the EEC emerged, that
the European community seemed to find its stride, leveraging its combined cultural and
economic influence to secure and increase prosperity in the face of the Cold War. During
this era, the “economic community” not only increased its membership, but also further
integrated cultural and civil institutions in order to enhance the European common
identity, and not just their checkbooks. The EEC era represents, to me, the power of
institutionalized collaboration, and therefore a response to Realism.
One final school of political theory that will be of use when considering the history of
successful European integration is Constructivism. The Constructivist perspective is not
20

so concerned with the inherently anarchic system that drives the analysis of Realism and
Liberalism. Instead, Constructivists are concerned with the rules that govern society, as
well as their fundamentally fluid nature. Regimes change, say the Constructivists, as do
the tendencies and behavior of actors that they influence within the international system.
Constructivism is obviously relevant for the study of European integration. Accordingly,
the preexisting norms create the regimes and institutions in the images of people’s
thoughts and perspectives.13 Successful international integration, such as when citizens
from disparate European states adopt a common regional identity, leaves a deep and
reasonably permanent effect on the international system, and therefore necessarily
assumes evolving norms and regimes. A Constructivist perspective provides the tools to
observe and analyze the trends that make this change possible. Analyzing our cases
through a Constructivist lens will shed light on the way that rival European actors
overcame their competitive instincts and inspired their constituents to embrace
cooperation.
I argue that the Constructivist perspective is best applied to our final case, the Treaty of
Maastricht (1992) establishing the European Union. The formation of the EU represents a
commitment above and beyond community and sharing. As its name suggests, the EU
was a step toward “unification,” a paradigm shift that would not only coordinate policies
and markers across disparate states. Now, the EU would address identities of European
citizens themselves, challenging age-old notions of borders, allegiance and culture that
had existed since the birth of the Westphalian Age. Maastricht represents a diplomatic

13

Christian Reus-Smit, “Constructivism,” in Theories of International Relations (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2009), page 212.
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milestone in which Europeans were encouraged to change the way that they view
themselves and each other, an impossibility without an unconventional perception of the
international system and an open mind. Such an approach calls for Constructivist thought.
Theories of integration
In addition to the three major paradigms mentioned above, the phenomenon of
integration lends itself to theoretical analysis, according to various schools. Three
particular perspectives will help frame the process and interests of European states as
they pursued a path of cooperation in lieu of competition. In contrast with Realism,
Liberalism and Constructivism, the theories of integration as elucidated below seem to be
more empirical in essence. They may help explain how states come to cooperate with one
another, though perhaps to varying degrees of relevance in each case.
The first theoretical paradigm of political integration, and the one that perhaps played the
greatest role in influencing the initial catalyst to successful European integration, is the
school of Functionalism. Functionalists believe that states will be able to find common
ground with other states for cooperation and integration if they share a common problem,
called a function. When they see eye-to-eye with respect to a certain function, and find
that they can procure a solution to it through joining together, the process of integration is
under way.14 The functionalist approach encourages and predicts that competitive actors
might embrace their mutual weaknesses, and work together to achieve an optimal
possibility frontier, a seemingly Liberal notion. However, functionalists are also
sometimes seen as great pessimists, since the only path to peace and cooperation is

14

Harrison, page 28.
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through a universal integration. Our first case, the 1951 Treaty of Paris establishing the
European Coal and Steel Community, was very much influenced by Functionalist
thinkers.
The second school of integration theory is known as Neofunctionalism. Neofunctionalists
stress the importance of the integration process on the meaningful and effective
intergovernmental institutions that are formed through international negotiation. The
focus is less on the specific issues and problems facing the actors, as well as their mutual
solution. Instead, the institutions created through the initial engagement and ensuing
agreement are of prime importance, specifically as to the degree that they have achieved
prestige and permanence in the eyes of the constituent populace. For Neofunctionalists,
successful integration occurs where there has been a Functional spillover from the
original mandate of the institution. Seemingly due to its supranational nature, the
institution has achieved a runaway degree of prestige in the eyes of the people, who now
look to it and similar programs to resolve assorted disputes or implement cultural,
commercial or economic norms. Neofunctionalists, in order to affect integration, look for
well-established, popular institutions that provide an alternative channel for citizens to
engage in cross-border communication and compromises without the direct intervention
of their respective governments.15 Our second case, the 1957 Treaty of Rome
establishing the European Economic Community, seems in many respects a paradigmatic
validation of Neofunctionalist theory as regional actors embraced supranational
institutions.

15Ibid.,

page 78.
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Key to the success of integration, according to nearly every perspective, is the concept of
spillover. Spillover refers to the way that one political, cultural or economic arena
inspires another. Very broadly speaking, when one arena, or regime, that has been the
target of integration gains the necessary momentum to inspire the mutual cooperation and
solution seeking of additional problems (according to Functionalists) or the expansion of
supranational institutions, “take-off” has been achieved. Take-off is a vital component of
any effective political integration movement, and it has been observed to great effect in
all three cases to be studied in this thesis.
One last perspective on integration is Federalism. Federalists are less concerned about the
process that leads competitive actors to cooperate so much as they are concerned with the
quality and impact of sovereign federal institutions independent of sovereign regional
institutions.16 A Federalist observing European integration might be most interested in
the proper construction and implementation of supranational regimes in order to
effectively mollify competing constituent states. Powerful federal institutions influence
constituent actors and citizens, and themselves become objects of study within the
regional system. My third case, the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht establishing the European
Union is in many ways a product of Federalist theory, as Europeans consider integration,
and grapple with dissolution and reorganization of national identities.
Testing for success
My hypothesis is that successful regional integration in Europe, however gradual, was not
a spontaneous reaction to acute external pressures. Instead, I argue that successful
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regional integration was the result of a shared vision and careful planning by policy
makers and negotiators, who never shied away from addressing lofty ideals even as they
attempted to resolve practical considerations.
Based on my research of critics and observers witnessing European integration in the 20 th
century, I have compiled a list of six distinct criteria that must be fulfilled if an
international agreement will lead to lasting regional integration. These criteria address all
manner of issues that negotiators consider or ignore as they craft an agreement: shortterm and long-term; practical and idealistic; mundane and lofty. This “test” will be
useful for illustrating how exactly these three cases represent instances of successful
integration, and how exactly other attempts at policy coordination fell short in this
pursuit. Finally, I argue that any diplomatic accord that seeks to resolve any outstanding
regional conflict or further European unification must necessarily account for these six
criteria, or else risk disappointment. In summation, these six criteria are a means of
measuring how each case and treaty conforms to integration theory.
A. Creativity: A successful treaty is necessarily creative as it proposes a settlement in
complicated and sensitive negotiations. When the negotiating parties are sincere
about improving the status quo and achieving a more beneficial situation, policy
makers should be able to provide a vision for not just a better outcome with respect to
the conventional arrangement, but an especially different one. When the negotiations
stall and parties grow frustrated, a creative negotiator will suggest never-before
considered alternatives, shedding a new light on a possible final agreement. Most
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importantly, exciting, novel solutions breathe new life into a summit when
negotiations seem to have grown stagnant, or worse, hopeless.17
B. Prescience: Visionary leaders should steer negotiations in the direction of trends and
institutions that will serve a final agreement well in the years to come. Successful
negotiations that result in lasting agreements are necessarily well-equipped to endure
through uncertain future circumstances.18
C. Responsiveness: A visionary leader is aware of the geopolitical neighborhood in
which negotiating parties reside, both internationally and at home. Such leaders are
conscious of their reputations, and keep their eyes and ears open in order to work with
and address the interests of non-state groups with a stake in the final agreement. 19
D. Perspective: Visionary leaders negotiating successful agreements have a sharp sense
of perspective. In a negotiation, they favor the long-game, opting for absolute gains
over relative ones.20
E. Forward-thinking: Another characteristic of successful deal makers in regional
integration is that they give in to strong institutions. This enables them to borrow
from the future to politically finance today, in order to get a deal done. 21
F. Big picture: Finally, successful integration agreements give special consideration to
the fallout and payoffs beyond the immediate geographic scope of the negotiations. In
a bilateral negotiation, they account for the larger regional implications. In a regional
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summit, they direct an eye toward the global opportunities that may result from a
lasting agreement in order to build consensus among members. 22
As mentioned, I will reference directly the articles and preambles of the agreements to
demonstrate what about my cases make them examples for successful integration.
Additionally, I will draw upon documents, speeches and essays that have been passed
down to us from visionary leaders and negotiators at these agreements that speak to their
application with respect to these six criteria.
Using this multi-faceted approach, I will provide a complete picture as to the elements
that comprise successful and long-lasting integration agreements. Proficiency in systems
theory, integration theory and these academic criteria provide a solid three-legged table
on which to base future policy coordination and regional unification.
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Chapter 4:
Case #1: The Treaty of Paris (1951) Establishing the European Coal and Steel
Community
In the spring of 1951, European civilization was in a very different place than it is today,
particularly with respect to economic and political life. Although there were a number of
nascent intergovernmental institutions in operation, each with the aim of strengthening
cooperation and prosperity throughout what could be called Western Europe, these bodies
were not exclusively of Europeans by Europeans. Instead, they seemed to be mainly
directed by foreign or global parties that were acting upon the region of Western Europe,
still very much a society licking its wounds from the complete social breakdown of the
Second World War. However, this sad state of affairs underwent a subtle yet
fundamental evolution, when representatives of six European states signed the Treaty of
Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The treaty was an
accord within Europe and for Europe that not only eased the region’s recovery, but also
set the underpinnings for a strong intergovernmental organization that would one day
leverage regional unity to influence international markets and global policy.
Before the 1951 Treaty of Paris, which established the ECSC, there were a number of
international institutions already in place since the end of the WWII, to make sure that
European states worked together with the international community to align interests and
rebuild a devastated society. The backdrop of the Cold War provided major external
impetuses in the formation of these organizations, and for forcing European states to
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cooperate with each other and the West. 23 The end of World War II saw the international
community led by two new-comer states (perhaps, at extreme ends of “the West,”)
ascend to opposite poles in a new bipolar system. The European continent, a main World
War II theater, was located directly between the two superpowers as the infamous “Iron
Curtain.” The Soviet Union, from the east, tried to extend their influence and power
westward through Europe, while the United States, from the west, countered communism
to promote their own brand of democracy and values.24 Each superpower provided
material support to protect and promote the security, economic and political assets that
they deemed vital. International organizations were one tool at the disposal of the United
States that provided an opportunity to indirectly influence European affairs.
With the threat of Soviet invasion ever-present, security considerations were among the
first European interests to be whipped into line by an international institution during the
Cold War. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was organized in 1948 to provide a
common defense in the West against the Soviet Union. NATO was and is a decidedly
intergovernmental organization, respectful of member state sovereignty, and not
assuming any supranational institutions in itself. By 1951, it consisted of twelve
democratic member states from North America and northern and western Europe
(notably excluding “Germany,” the site of the east-west Cold War fault line).
According to the founding treaty, NATO proposes to safeguard democratic principles, as
well as each member state. An attack on one NATO member is to be considered an
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attack on all, and obligates every member in each other’s defense. 25 Most notably, this
principle sends a signal to the international community that the United States, the
dominating member of the NATO security alliance, would be ready to intervene in
Europe if a member state seemed vulnerable to Soviet takeover.
On the political front, the most important international organization in the world in 1951
was the United Nations. The UN General Assembly was and is a political body founded
on the principles of basic human rights and dignity that welcomes all member states to
the table as political equals. In its early years, it was a response to the moral devastation
and humanitarian destruction wrought by World War II26, and in this sense attempted to
indirectly address the root crises that led to the war, many of which were to be found in
Europe. However, as a globally-minded organization, it could not adequately address the
needs of Europe, nor could it provide an environment that fused the interest of European
countries vis-à-vis the rest of the world. A global body such as the UN could also be
susceptible to powerful actors from outside Europe attempting to influence internal
European alliances and regional politics.
On the economic front, the most significant international organization in Europe by 1951
was the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). OEEC was a body
established by European states in 1948 to help enable the appropriate allocation and
distribution of funds provided through the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan consisted of
American aid provided to European states, possessions and colonies to rebuild Europe
after WWII and stave off the spread of communism and Soviet influence. 27 Additionally,
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it promoted economic stability through supporting American exports and lowering trade
and currency barriers.28 However, by working very closely with the United States and
Canada in the early years, as well as ultimately welcoming them into OEEC ranks (when
they evolved in to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), OEEC
more closely resembled an international organization rather than a regional one. 29
One last European organization that bears mentioning is the Council of Europe, most
notable for the very general nature of its mission. Founded by European states in 1949
with the stated aim of increasing “unity” and safeguarding “ideas and principles,” 30 the
treaty evokes separate states working together to promote regional interests. However,
very little is actually stated regarding the specifics of such interests, or the actual duties
and responsibilities of the Council with respect to European society. By the early 1950s,
the Council of Europe seems to have provided a symbolic measure of coordination and
consideration between member states, rather than an actual engine of policy.
It is in this challenging environment, of severely weakened European countries clinging
to their national identities, that the seeds of meaningful European integration were
conceived. Europeans were desperate to reconstruct their societies from the ashes of the
war, yet instead of making war on each other, they were now plagued by external
political meddling and lingering economic upheaval. Before long, a few visionary
leaders stepped forward to shine a light on a real possibility for integration: The European
Coal and Steel Community. This bold plan brought a new political course within reach,
implementing regional unification on a scale that had previously seemed elusive. In the
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ECSC, particularly realized through the commitment and vision of French and German
leaders, Europe embraced efficiency and common institutions while finally blunting the
appetite for hostile nationalistic competition over borders and markets.
The European Coal and Steel Community: the beginnings of integration
In April 1951, six states in Europe, most notably the ancient enemies of France and
Germany (plus Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg), signed the Treaty of
Paris, pledging to form a common market with respect to the coal and steel industries. In
addition to finding the consensus points for breaking down economic barriers between
the nations, it also established a number of organs to cement these measures in place.
There was an intergovernmental Council of Ministers, a professional advisory panel, an
assembly of delegates from each member state, a judiciary to settle disputes, and most
notably a supranational High Authority that acted as a secretariat in executing the policies
of the ECSC. Among the responsibilities enumerated in the treaty, the agreement tasked
the High Authority with stabilizing prices and standards throughout the market with
respect to coal and steel, improving working conditions, eliminating inter-ECSC tariffs
and duties, and coordinating commercial relationships with third parties. 31
In time, the community had mixed success in its immediate mission of “contributing to
economic expansion” and the “rational distribution of production” through the unification
of coal and steel, but its real legacy was in the lasting impression it made on the footprint
of regional political machinery by establishing a “European ambiance and presence”. 32
Before long, the ECSC was deemed popular enough that the community grew both
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horizontally (in membership) and vertically (in scope). Within a decade of its execution,
more European states lobbied to accede to the agreement, and these member states
pursued furthering the fences of this community in order to encompass additional
economic and cultural frontiers. The success of this unification could be attributed to the
fact that it provided for true regional integration.
The miracle of the ECSC, a firmly embedded regional organization in Europe, was no
accident. It was the result of a close-knit group of visionaries leading European countries
through the turbulent post-war period. In fact, the very summit that led to the negotiation
of the ECSC can be traced to a 1950 address by French foreign minister Robert
Schumann, which came to be known as the Schumann Declaration.

The Schumann

Declaration had two additional parents aside from its namesake: the famous French
statesman Jean Monnet and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who embraced the
ideas of the declaration.
The declaration brazenly proposed nothing short of world peace, an aim that could be
achieved through European unification, specifically via a Franco-German union. Given
the fact that France and Germany had been at war for hundreds of years, and only five
years prior had wrapped up the bloodiest conflict in world history, the plan could have
only sounded crazy enough to work. “Any action taken,” wrote Schumann, “must in the
first place concern these two countries.” Although France and Germany had been
historic enemies, any organic European union that did not include them both was doomed
to fail. Schumann explicitly called for a bilateral coal and steel community. These two
industries represented fuel and weapons, the very bread and butter of war-making. At the
same time, they were critical for infrastructure building, manufacturing and foreign trade.
33

Combining French and German coal and steel production, stated Schumann, would
eliminate economic competition and jealousy, encourage cooperation and demilitarize the
seeds of armament.33
Schumann, Monnet and their team were well positioned to suggest surrendering
sovereign authority over French coal and steel production and extending an olive branch
to Adenauer, despite France’s complicated history with Germany. For one thing, France
was facing a potential economic crisis, due to an imbalance in the amount of coal and
steel being produced (Urwin 44). French leadership, based on a number of international
reports, was convinced that regional coordination of resource production and allocation
was the only way to rebuild the local economy. For another, France saw that West
Germany was already showing signs of strong economic and industrial recovery.
Convincing the as yet vulnerable Germans to join a regional partnership would provide
the still dominant French with an opportunity to monitor and influence German recovery
better than the cumbersome international monitors that had been in place since the end of
the war. Finally, in a common market, France could gain access to cheap German
industrial production, specifically steel. 34 Also of note, the international crisis of the
Korean War brought additional demand to the market for European steel.
From Adenauer’s perspective, joining a limited union with the rival French also provided
selfish benefits for West Germany. As stated above, it allowed for more local
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supervision over the German industrial recovery and resource production, together with
the French, instead of foreign and multinational monitors such as the International Ruhr
Authority imposed by the Allied victors. In essence, it repositioned Germans to reclaim
their own sovereignty over such capabilities, albeit shared with their French neighbors.
Additionally, Germans’ accepting of the French overtures of peace, and committing
themselves to cooperate in a united European society, could help restore their goodwill
and trust with the international community. Ultimately, with this goodwill in hand,
Germans could hope that the sanctions imposed by the Allies might one day be removed
completely.35
While Schumann seems to have been influenced by political and economic realities in
proposing his vision for the ECSC, his advisor Jean Monnet was a fierce integrationist
who in time came to be known as the “father of Europe.” 36 Monnet was a member of the
Functionalist school of integration theory, which believed that specific needs known as
“functions” were where distinct interest groups could find common ground and achieve
integration.37 Where two distinct interest groups share a need, they can also share a
solution. Through focusing on their Functional similarities, rivals can team-up to solve
problems together through joint institutions, ultimately affecting the way that they see
each other and inspiring further spillover integration. Functionalists like Monnet
believed that regional integration was a stepping stone to universal integration. 38
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In 1962, Monnet looked back on the Schumann Declaration of 1950. With regard to the
looming economic and industrial crises in Europe, Monnet wrote that “the resources of a
single nation were not sufficient.” France and Germany’s problems “were no longer
solely of national concern, but were mutual European responsibilities.” Brokering the
ECSC, in Monnet’s perception, “was a technical step, but its new procedures, under
“common institutions,” created a silent revolution in men’s minds. 39 Common
institutions are the key to integration according to students of Functionalism and
Neofunctionalism. They are engines that create what scholars call “spillover,” defined as
the point when cooperation in one specific area becomes normative, and inspires further
cooperation in other sectors. The key to affecting the behavior of nations was to
influence their inherently selfish nature. And the way to appeal to that nature was
through a gradual “chain reaction” initially set off by a Functionalist approach and such
institutions.40
Testing the ECSC
The ECSC agreement, in achieving a degree of significant economic unification between
Germany and France, also laid the foundations for a political bridge across the historic
chasm that separated the two nations. For centuries, these two states, and frequently
their neighbors, could not agree on anything. To the contrary, they grasped for every
opportunity to antagonize each other. Limitless amounts of blood was spilled in the
name of religious, social, and material causes. As I argue, it was the vision and
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commitment imbued into the agreement by its key proponents that was behind the
ECSC’s lasting feasibility.
Creativity: One aspect in which its fathers’ vision played a role in its success was due to
the fact that the ECSC proposed a new solution to address an old problem. The
immediate objectives facing European policy makers in the late 1940s and early 1950s
were rebuilding society from the devastation of WWII and banishing the appetite for
military conflict (particularly from Germany). However, the successes of conventional
attempts at affecting meaningful organic political cooperation were stunted or
inconclusive. The OEEC was not equipped to address the long-term objective of a
European peace41, and the strictly political Council of Europe was little more than a
symbolic clearinghouse of ideas, lacking any meaningful influence. With the launching
of the ECSC, as proposed in the Schumann Declaration, a lasting Franco-German peace,
and ultimately political coordination, could be achieved through economic and industrial
cooperation.

Instead of leading with politics to affect economic change, or even

cynically isolating the realms from one another, the new order envisioned by the fathers
of the ECSC proposed achieving the relatively modest aim of finding mutually beneficial
economic common ground as a precursor to political unity.
Prescience: The ECSC agreement was particularly well-suited to anticipate future trends
and outlast future pressures. Schumann and his team, prior to the declaration, wisely
anticipated the difficulties France and other European nations might face in attempting to
spur economic development based on existing national capabilities and resources. 42
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Through a common market for coal and steel, not only could the domestic market benefit
from greater efficiency and economies of scale, but Europe could become a global
destination for industrial materials. This return to global power, albeit as a unified entity
in a limited commercial arena, might have been an unintended consequence of the vision
of the founding fathers.
Responsiveness: The Schumann Declaration, laying the groundwork for an ECSC
agreement, is extraordinary in that it is not addressed to the West German government
(Schumann’s counterparts) or the French cabinet (Schumann’s constituency), but instead
to the people of Germany and Europe as much as to France. Schumann spoke of
increased standard of living, equal access to material and labor, and of course, enduring
peace and security. By addressing the pooling of transnational markets, an agreement for
a coal and steel community, according to Schumann’s declaration, necessarily appealed
to civil society and transnational interests. And of course, the final agreement signed in
Paris included the necessary institutions to respond to these issues. The High Authority
and the ECSC Court of Justice executed supranational policy and mediated disputes.
Additional organs, like the advisory panel that recruited common professionals from
across the member states and the Common Assembly gave the European public a seat at
the table, which was rare for the strictly intergovernmental organizations that
predominated during the period.
Perspective: It is true that in proposing and launching the ECSC, Schumann and his
colleagues saw the immediate benefits of such an arrangement. Efficient markets for
France, and prestige for West Germany. However, the way that the Schumann
Declaration and final ECSC agreement played the long game was truly visionary. Until
38

this point, some organizations like OEEC or NATO carried out short-term objectives well
enough with a high degree of political collaboration in the short-term, but did little to aim
for any long-term goals or effect significant spillover in that they specifically lacked
supranational institutions. The ECSC, by contrast, created a community that was formed
along very specific parameters, yet aimed for the long-term. Because the ECSC asked for
such a minimal non-threatening commitment from its members (specific industrial
cooperation for 50 years), it could count on long-term political cooperation and goodwill.
Forward thinking: The framers of the ECSC were especially forward thinking, in that the
agreement is best remembered for the strong institutions that, as we shall see, inspired the
Treaty of European Economic Community. namely the High Authority and the Court of
Justice. Other groups operating in Europe at the time, such as NATO, OEEC and the
Council of Europe, relied on intergovernmental cooperation instead of asking states to
defer sovereignty to limited yet independent supranational agencies. In these other
organizations, states did not surrender any sovereignty, but they also missed out on any
opportunity for integration through membership.
Big picture: Another sign of a visionary agreement is one that addresses not only the
immediate jurisdiction and member states, but also the surrounding environment. The
ECSC meets this criterion in a number of ways. Most notably, it relieved long-lasting
belligerent tensions between France and Germany. Additionally, it showed the superpower potential of a united Europe, when the ECSC took effect and began to participate
in international markets and global trade.
In light of the above analysis, the success of the ECSC cannot be considered a mystery or
coincidence, but rather a deliberate product of dedicated vision and careful planning.
39

Over time, this blueprint helped realize similarly positive results in other regional
agreements, especially my other cases.
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Chapter 5:
Case #2: The Treaty of Rome (1957) Establishing the European Economic
Community
Europe’s experiences under the ECSC influenced the continent’s alliances throughout the
1950s, and raised questions as to the feasibility of integration in other sectors, specifically
with regard to the economy, politics and culture. Various attempts at further integration
in Europe, inspired by the success of the ECSC consensus, eventually led to my second
case, the Treaty of Rome 1957 establishing the European Economic Community.
Shortcomings of the ECSC
After several years since taking effect, it was soon apparent that the ECSC was in many
ways less than perfect as an agreement calling for integration, even with respect to its
narrow mandate of unifying coal and steel markets. The ECSC had a number of
problems executing its mission. It did not succeed in eradicating subsidies across the six
member states, and community supranational institutions, as established in the
agreement, were poorly equipped to deal with the ensuing issues when national interests
prevailed over regional ones. 43 In short, ECSC institutions were starkly inadequate from
a Neofunctionalist perspective, and these inadequacies came to the fore as economic
pressures mounted.
Although Functionalism brought the ECSC together, it was not enough to sustain the
integration movement. A European community of states needed stronger central
institutions, perhaps a point that was overlooked in 1951 due to the ECSC’s Functionalist
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pedigree. It also is true that, despite its shortcomings, no members ever threatened to
leave the agreement. 44

In other words, the union was sustained even when it failed in its

execution of stated aims. This can be seen as a sign of political spillover, as states clung
to other ideals beyond the coal and steel community in order to justify their commitment.
As ECSC institutions struggled with execution, member states across the board were
reluctant to surrender additional sovereignty that might have directly addressed such
challenges.45 This seems a direct validation of the Functionalist origins of the ECSC,
since member states were invested in the association through their common functions and
issues, and not through any supranational organs or regional government. Although the
aims of the agreement languished, the union itself flourished, and became a fixture of the
international political landscape.
The institutionalization of the ECSC, which paved the way for a greater European
community, stands in sharp contrast with another failed attempt at regional organization
of the era, the European Defense Community (EDC). The EDC was a brain-child of the
1950s that sought to unite European security interests (perhaps through a common army)
in much the same way that the ECSC united states behind a common market for coal and
steel. It was born out of the Functionalist idea that total integration in a region can be
affected sector by sector. 46
The EDC had a few characteristics in its “DNA” that seemed antithetical to the genesis of
the ECSC, and perhaps figured into its failure as a regional organization. Firstly, the
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EDC was specifically designed to ingratiate certain members to join, namely the UK and
a rearmed West Germany, whereas the ECSC was an organic initiative of French and
German leaders, with other states tagging along. Secondly, an EDC called for nonequality among members, with some states receiving a greater share of responsibility and
power. Thirdly, the EDC became linked with other non-regional international
organizations, such as NATO. While the ECSC was an independent organization that
sought to influence international and regional markets on its own terms, the EDC was
conceived in the context that it would support NATO’s operations at home and abroad.
In 1952, Adenauer anticipated a fundamental challenge to an EDC that precedes even
logistical considerations: That a common European army must necessarily assume a
common European foreign policy. 47 In other words, some critical level of political
unification must precede security unification.
Although the debate opened a political rift between France and Germany, years of
political wrangling around an EDC led to the birth of the Western European Union. It
may have represented a step backwards from regional integration in that it strengthened
national armies, supported the international NATO, and relegated social and cultural
concerns to an outside organization, the Council of Europe. 48
Despite the failure of idealistic attempts at integration such as the EDC, which called for
ambitious attempts at sweeping fundamental integration, the ECSC was poised to provide
a platform for meaningful change. Unlike an EDC which sought an uneven distribution
of power among members in spite of an extremely sensitive mandate, the ECSC enjoyed
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a total consensus among member states, despite its limited political scope and ranks.
Additionally, it had existing supranational institutions that carried viability and credibility
with member governments that could be used as a springboard for “political community”
beyond coal and steel integration. 49 This factor in the ultimate formation of the European
Economic Community is a validation of Neofunctionalism, how supranational institutions
themselves can affect integration.
In 1955, in Messina, Functionalism took the spotlight one last time as ECSC leaders met
to discuss coordination of a common nuclear policy. The nuclear issue was a fortuitous
function for the community to address, following coal and steel, since it proved
extremely attainable and non-controversial. In contrast with some other possible sectors
of integration, such as transportation or agriculture, there were very few industrial groups
in civil society in 1955 who were directly involved with nuclear industries. This meant
that the governments could negotiate at face-value, without having to bargain with tradeunions, political parties or other transnational interest groups. The nuclear issue was
basically a one-level game. Secondly, a coordinated nuclear policy could provide
member states with a cheap and attractive source of energy for their rapidly
industrializing and growing economies. 50 That same year, the Messina conference
directly authorized the formation of a supranational ECSC committee to explore the
possibility for further integration in Europe, to be led by Belgian statesman Paul Henri
Spaak. Spaak also searched for additional opportunities for integration in the commercial
realms, above and beyond coal, steel and nuclear power.
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The Spaak Report framed technical considerations for what a common market and other
integrated commercial interests in Europe could look like. In 1957, the six ECSC nations
signed the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community, which
encompassed the original ECSC. Concurrently, the same six nations also formed a
separate entity (under a separate treaty) called EURATOM, which coordinated the
peaceful use of nuclear energy.
The Spaak Report and the Treaty
The Spaak Committee had a rather narrow mandate to explore and ascertain specific
instances for a common European market, and this mission is reflected in the very
extensive and technical language of the report. However, underneath the tariff rates and
percentage points lies a foundation that gives away an agenda of building Neofunctional
consensus. For example, the Spaak Report recommends that states in a common market
should share the windfall in a particular sector, so that one member will not benefit at the
expense of another. It calls for a European Commission, a supranational institution to
broker between strong and weaker members, especially when parties are sensitive to
certain membership considerations. The Spaak Report calls for a gradual accession to
common market standards, in order to accommodate vulnerable states. In the event that
one state is struggling to meet the standards and commitments of membership, the
European Commission may afford extensions and assistance. One final consideration
that stands out in Spaak’s language is a respect for other supranational commitments,
such as GATT. All of these factors point to a desire to strengthen supranational
institutions, and for member states to look to a powerful central body and internal
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procedures for settling their disputes, instead of through confrontation with other
members.51
As if there were any doubt as to the motivations of the ECSC six when formulating the
European Economic Community, based solely on the text of the Spaak Report, the
preamble to the Treaty of Rome removes all of it. Not only does it clearly state the
political intentions behind this seemingly technical and commercial accord, but it also
invites other European states to join the movement. The preamble references
“foundations of an ever-closer union,” “progress,” “steady expansion,” “solidarity” as per
the political nature of the United Nations, and explicitly calls to “the other peoples of
Europe who share the ideal.” In fact, an equal amount of text in the preamble is accorded
to the political and idealistic objectives of the agreement as to the commercial ones:
DETERMINED to establish the foundations of an ever closer union among
the European peoples,
DECIDED to ensure the economic and social progress of their countries
by common action in eliminating the barriers which divide Europe,
DIRECTING their efforts to the essential purpose of constantly improving
the living and working conditions of their peoples,
RECOGNISING that the removal of existing obstacles calls for concerted
action in order to guarantee a steady expansion, a balanced trade and fair
competition,
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ANXIOUS to strengthen the unity of their economies and to ensure their
harmonious development by reducing the differences existing between the
various regions and by mitigating the backwardness of the less favoured,
DESIROUS of contributing by means of a common commercial policy to
the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade,
INTENDING to confirm the solidarity which binds Europe and overseas
countries, and desiring to ensure the development of their prosperity, in
accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
RESOLVED to strengthen the safeguards of peace and liberty by
establishing this combination of resources, and calling upon the other
peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts… 52
The European Economic Community, as put forth in the Treaty, establishes a number of
organs to fulfill its mission of coordinating economic policy, establishing a common
market and promoting political unification across Europe:


A Parliament to advise and supervise (equivalent to the Assembly of the ECSC)
appointed by member governments;53



A Council of Ministers to make decisions and coordinate policy; 54



A European Commission, totally independent of member governments, to execute
the Treaty;55
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A Court of Justice to interpret the Treaty, and hear cases between member states
and between the Commission and member states; 56



And an Economic and Social Committee.57

The Economic and Social Committee was comprised of professionals from member
states from various economic, industrial and social backgrounds. It enjoyed advisory
status, and specifically included sub committees for transportation and agriculture (as per
the treaty). In other words, the European Economic Community was a strict economic
agreement, with spillover specifically built into its institutions.58
A number of articles throughout the document bear mentioning as to the wisdom behind
the agreement, precisely what may have helped the EEC achieve renown among scholars
as a “model of peaceful change.” 59
For example, article 73 of the Treaty of Rome paints a picture of the European
Commission as a single administration for three separate communities: The European
Coal and Steel Community; The European Economic Community; and Euratom, the
aforementioned nuclear agreement also signed in Rome. 60 In this way, the Treaty seems
to paradoxically encourage unification through acknowledgment of diversity It doesn’t
blend the separate spheres, it only brings them into an umbrella arrangement.
Article 75 builds high walls around the issues of national security. The agreement
respects national security, privacy and arms trading deals in each member state.States that
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join the European Community need not worry about having to disclose or renege on these
sensitive deals. In the case of a conflict, the European Commission may broker a
solution.
Articles 224-226 are what I call articles of flexibility. These articles provide guidance and
call for flexibility in order to keep the Community functioning, even though black swan
events may rear their heads in certain member states. Such events might consist of
political turmoil or economic pressures.
Article 240 differs considerably from a principle established in Paris in 1951. The article
states that the Treaty will be in force for an unlimited time, in contrast with the ECSC
which was only a 50 year commitment. 61 This forever clause indicates how leaders at the
Rome summit met with their eyes toward changing the map for future generations.
Testing the EEC
The Treaty of Rome signed by the six states of the ECSC laid the foundation for lasting
policy coordination in Europe, by taking a turn toward the Neofunctionalist, in
comparison with my first case.
Creativity: Similar to the way that the ECSC represented a backlash of pragmatism to
foreign meddling and vapid idealism that constituted other inadequate international
organizations, the formulation of the EEC was also conceived in an environment of failed
attempts at political integration. The disappointment of the EDC debacle (having given
way to an ineffectual WEU) sent ECSC leaders reexamining their own hyper-pragmatic
functionalist roots. While steeped in practical discussions around integrating the nuclear
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sector, ECSC parties were inspired to reach for political unification by dusting off and
repolishing their existing supranational institutions, namely the High Authority
(inspiration for the “European Commission” in the EEC) and the Court of Justice.
European leaders at Messina discovered the way forward by reviving a path that was long
left for dead. In this, they also breathed new life into the movement for political
unification in the region.
Prescience: In the preamble, the EEC’s signatories state their ultimate political aims of
permanent European unification and peace. However, the treaty does not stop at
describing the responsibilities of member states to the agreement with respect to
achieving these idealistic aims. Instead, it spends a considerable amount of text regarding
flexibility for states in crisis and mediating disputes between states themselves (through a
supranational commission) and between states at the periphery and the core (through
broad powers granted to the commission and through a judiciary). These aspects made
the treaty immediately attractive not only to the six signatories in Rome, but also to all
states in the region, be they large or small or rich or poor. The treaty, even in 1957 before
any sweeping revisions (which would be made over the decades), was a sincere effort at
inclusion, and envisioned a future where a greater diversity of states could be party to the
agreement.
Responsiveness: The framers of the Treaty of Rome were very conscious of how the
agreement might be accepted and challenged when in effect, and learned from the lessons
of other failed attempts at integration. One example that comes to mind is how the Treaty
specifically excludes jealously guarded defense-related issues from its purview.
Additionally, it encourages member states to appeal to its supranational institutions,
50

namely the European Commission, instead of each other in the event of a difference of
interpretation. Finally, its establishment of an official advisory Economic and Social
Committee specifically gives a voice to civilians across Europe who are not necessarily
enfranchised through the political establishment, yet represented broad transnational
interests. As Haas suggested, this committee provides a unique opportunity for policy
makers to understand and influence citizens on a supranational level.
Perspective: Once again, this refers to the way that although treaty framers explicitly
reached for the lofty, they asked only for concrete commercial commitments from
members, in a practical timeline.
Forward-thinking: The Treaty of Rome was made possible by preexisting supranational
institutions held over from the ECSC. By recognizing their importance and by
strengthening these institutions, the European Community could now interface and
cultivate relationships directly with other states, including those in the region not yet a
party to the treaty. This Neofunctionalist consideration played an important role in
helping the community expand over the years.
Big picture: The common market of the EEC brought drastic changes within the region. It
affected lives by guaranteeing property, movement, employment and tariffs across
member states. In a real sense, it forged a solid political block out of the region, and
increased the prestige and negotiating power of that block. Although policy expansion
and integration in the community slowed during the 1970s,62 membership grew
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substantially and the dreams of Rome’s preamble would inspire a new generation to seek
unification on an even grander scale in the 1980s.
As I suggested, the formation of the EEC represented both a turn toward
Neofunctionalism (as further integration was based on central Functionalist institutions
carried over from the ECSC agreement), but this deepening of the political bond between
European states also represents a victory for Liberalist theory. With the greater degree of
cooperation and the calls for “unity and “solidarity” of the Rome Treaty’s preamble, in
addition to the deliberate spillover as engineered through the formation of the Economic
and Social Committee and subcommittees, the “original six” appeared more optimistic
about the prospects of long-term integration, and less apprehensive about empowering
their neighbors through mutual collaboration. Additionally, the way that the treaty
invited other states in the region to join the movement, as well as the fact that it was only
a few years before other major European powers began to consider accession, is also an
indication as to the warmer climate in the region towards cooperation instead of
suspicion.
This new Liberal outlook and eventual normative shifts that took hold in the region
would, over the next few decades, pave the way for a Constructivist leadership to arise in
Europe, which would build on the EEC’s achievements to establish an even bigger and
more powerful regional organization.
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Chapter 6:
Case #3: The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) Establishing the European Union
Sometime in the decades that followed the Treaty of Rome and the establishment of the
EEC, the idea of regional unification in Europe became a part of the political landscape,
an institutional norm driving the community of states toward a formal union. During this
process, the community as a distinct political entity expanded greatly in membership
numbers and prestige. By the 1990s, even the most enthusiastic anti-Federalist member
state in the EEC, the United Kingdom, accepted unification as a foregone conclusion. In
this manner, the Treaty of Maastricht on European Union was unanimously signed by all
member states in 1992.
The family of Europe grows
Since the late 1950s, when the ECSC was metamorphosing into the EEC, the new
regional bloc had caught the attention of other European states. The United Kingdom
and the Scandinavian countries had anticipated the growing economic bargaining power
of the EEC, and formally established an European Free Trade Agreement in 1960 to
protect the markets of regional states who did not wish to join the Community.
Specifically in the case of the UK, interests lay with balancing against the new FrancoGerman axis, nurturing a close relationship with the United States (instead of aligning
with the EEC), and taking advantage of preferential commercial agreements with the
Commonwealth and the Sterling zone. However, as the decade wore on, British
influence on the world stage and with the United States waned, as did London’s authority
to dictate preferential terms to the Commonwealth. Faced with the prospect of being left
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behind by an increasingly powerful European community of states, applying for
admission to the bloc grew more attractive. In fact, trade within the EEC had been
doubling in size, and by 1961 represented the “world’s largest trading power.” 63 Two
separate applications for accession to the EEC were submitted by the UK during the
1960s, as London risked being isolated on the world stage, on the outside looking in at a
happy EEC family.
In 1962 and 1967, the UK and other EFTA states with close ties to the British economy
applied for membership in the EEC. Both of these applications were vetoed by a wary
President De Gaulle of France, who feared that the UK represented an American “Trojan
horse” and possibly also because he resented British power and prestige as a threat to
France.64 As the UK bids were shot down, the other states that had hoped for
membership due to their geographic and economic ties to the UK (Norway, Ireland and
Denmark) also withdrew their applications. By 1970, however, Charles De Gaulle had
left office, leaving in his stead a more agreeable French representation. Additionally,
Britain had been feeling more pressure to join the community than ever, 65 and offered the
European Community (EC), as the EEC was known since 1967, its most favorable terms
yet for accession. In January 1973, the bid was formally accepted, as were those of
Denmark and Ireland. Norway had their bid accepted, but failed to ratify the Treaty of
Rome at the domestic level, and declined membership. But the EC had its prize: The
third leg of the major European economies counted among its ranks. Additionally, by
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welcoming new states for the first time, the community realized an important milestone
on the road to long-term regional unification.
Although other states had applied for EEC/EC membership at a steady clip since 1958
(when Israel’s application for accession was rejected, presumably on geographic grounds,
soon followed by Greece and Turkey), the accession of the UK, Denmark and Ireland
were the only full members admitted until the 1980s. However, as Community
bargaining power and prestige increased even during years of global economic turmoil,
other countries in Western Europe came to lobby for membership. These states included
Portugal, Spain, Greece, Turkey and even some EFTA states that were afraid of being
locked out of a united Europe.
Steps toward supranationalism
In 1965, the European Commission, the independent body of the EEC charged with
administering the Treaty, officially absorbed Euratom and the ECSC, formally taking
over responsibilities for those agreements as well (though Euratom exists as a treaty apart
from the EEC agreement). Although the intergovernmental European Council
(composed of appointed national representatives) had long used its supreme authority to
check the power of supranational institutions such as the Commission, 1973’s Hague
Conference empowered the federal institutions as never before. 66 The Commission was
granted greater access to tax revenues and greater responsibilities, while the European
Parliament was given more control over the EC budget. However, intergovernmental
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wrangling over a number of economic and commercial initiatives stalled further political
unification.
Despite the difficulties in executing of its objectives, as before, no member state ever
threatened to leave the community. States parties remained bound to the community,
committed to the long-term goal of European unification. Without having yet realized
concrete objectives as envisioned in the EEC agreement, the members’ commitments
reflect a Federalist devotion, as the community took on a political life of its own.
Signs of political unification
Although they struggled to unite internally, EC states succeeded in many respects in
presenting a united front to the outside world. For one thing, the 1967 rebranding from a
European Economic Community to a more general European Community is a clue as to
the the long-held vision of states parties’ desire to strive for broader unification. By
1983, the EC as an independent unit had signed 30 agreements with more than 100
countries.67 Additionally, there were external factors at play that helped shape, on some
minimal level, a common European foreign policy. By necessity, the EC had a common
policy toward the Commonwealth, the oil shocks and Arab nationalism helped shape
policy towards MENA, and the fraying of the Iron Curtain in the 1980s encouraged
policy formulation with respect to Eastern Europe for the first time. 68 In the public
sphere, EC representatives spoke for the community of constituent states at several
international summits, including the United Nations General Assembly, and EEC
ambassadors began to meet at regular, frequent intervals to discuss foreign policy and
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agenda coordination. On the security front, with the fading of Soviet power, European
interests began to diverge with NATO, driving even neutral European states to consider
joining the EEC, and a revitalized WEU provided a convenient bridge to coordinate
strategy with NATO.69

Although there was no coordinated EC foreign policy in

anything but the most obtuse issues, it could also be said that member states were not
disinclined to discuss or seek common ground in international relations. 70 Time and time
again, this open minded-ness seemed to keep states involved in the union and invested in
its future, even when policy coordination seemed to falter.
The decade of the 1980s saw an endless series of reports and conferences aimed at
moving along political integration in Europe, as leaders seemed determined to tackle the
ultimate objective of the Schumann Declaration, issued years before. Each report and
conference attempted to address potential conflicts and pitfalls. Some proposals, such as
Spinelli’s Draft Treaty for a European Union (1984) reached for an idealistic, polished
organization of states. Others, such as the Dooge Report and the Milan Conference
(1985-6), considered practical policy issues and prerequisites for integration. All of these
summit meetings and research, absent of actual action, are perhaps an indication of
patience from “unification” advocates within the EC ranks as they accommodated
recalcitrant states (led by the UK and Premier Margaret Thatcher) opposed to unification.
But by the end of the decade, even dissenting states that supported intergovernmentalism
against a rising tide of supranationalism refused to consider leaving the community. 71
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As Federalist thought established itself among European leaders, the movement for
integration took on a new momentum. In 1985, a few EC states signed the Shengen
Agreement, which effectively sought to dissolve borders between states (though
implementation proved difficult, and is still controversial). In 1986, the EC countries
signed the Single European Act, which set a clear road map for regional integration
toward a political union of European states. In addition to officially rebranding the EC as
“the European Communities,” the SEA also called for a common market by 1992, which
was largely a consensus issue even at the fringes of the EC. Although this development
was hardly controversial, it was extremely significant in that it was specifically blessed
by the European Council. This gave the Commission and the Court, two federal bodies,
effective authority over domestic courts on certain domestic issues. 72 It was a selfimposed step toward supranationalism by member states. With the ball in the court of the
EC institutions, 1992 took on the feeling of an inevitability more than a target. 73
In the run-up to 1992, the Federalist Jacques Delors became the President of the
European Commission. He worked to implement the SEA and also three additional
items for a 1992 Maastricht conference that would go beyond simple economic
unification: A European monetary union; a social agreement on labor standards and
human rights; and a budget. He faced fierce opposition from the UK and Thatcher, who
favored expansion of the community over deeper integration, and disagreed with some
social components of Delors’s agenda. However, even though Thatcher embodied the
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very opposition to unification, even she acknowledged in 1988 the Federalist norm and
was in every respect “pro-EU:”
I am the first to say that on many great issues the countries of Europe
should try to speak with a single voice. I want to see us work more closely
on things that we can do better together than alone. Europe is stronger
when we do so, whether it be in trade, in defense or in relations with the
rest of the world.
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Delors, in a response to Thatcher the following year, discussed the importance of
Federalism for the future of the European Communities. He described how his European
union would require sovereignty while respecting pluralism and subsidiarity. This is
because Federalism, claimed Delors, in addition to espousing the importance of powerful
central/regional institutions (to govern citizens at the most efficient level), also preserves
national/local traditions and identities. In a conventional anarchic system, when states
are locked in competition, they are forever trying to subjugate and conquer each other,
with the aim of unifying the region under a single national and cultural banner. In a
Federalist system, by contrast, national boundaries and cultural backgrounds are
respected and imbued with formal legitimacy, protected and enshrined within the larger
community.75
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However, uniting Europe was more than a practical matter for Delors. It also hearkened
back to the dreams and destiny of Europeans. He acknowledged and emphasized that
necessity had finally brought European states together and the imperative that states take
advantage of this opportune moment in history to realize their destiny. Building a bridge
to Schumann and Monnet, Delors echoed the Functionalism that inspired the ECSC
founding fathers, by referencing the common challenges facing the members of the
European Communities. Only further Federalist coordination could provide the solution
to those challenges.
How are we to find a solution except by strengthening the federalist
features of the Community…? How are we to shoulder our international
responsibilities and at the same time pave the way for the emergence of a
greater Europe, except by pressing ahead with European integration?
Only a strong, self- confident Community, a Community which is united
and determined, can truly hope to control that process. 76
Finally, with a nod to Constructivism, Delors ends his speech by challenging the
Community to “make a telling contribution to the next phase of our history.” 77 People
should not fear national dissolution or bureaucratic paralysis from surrendering
sovereignty to a regional government. This is the way that European states will be
expected to meet their challenges in the future decades, and it is mechanically sound,
though perhaps difficult to envision.
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By the time the European Communities got to Maastricht in 1992, a “Treaty on European
Union” seemed all but inevitable, especially with a less combative British cabinet
following Thatcher’s exit. After its signing, ratification in member states proved
controversial at the domestic level, and a final version included numerous revisions
listing several state-specific exemptions and opt-outs. However, it was Federalist
thinking that pulled the negotiations together over the years, and throughout the ups and
downs of ratification, no member state ever threatened to leave the union. The EU has
remained an institution ever since. In the words of German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in
the run up to 1992, Maastricht “was crossing the Rubicon. There is no going back.”78
The Treaty
Despite the reams of state-specific exemptions, exceptions and revisions in the treaty, the
preamble and subsequent items speak to the purpose and the vision of the Maastricht
summit. Although Maastricht and the EU built on previous economic agreements, the
preamble implies that the organization is built on the ideals of political unification, civic
involvement and human rights. Firstly, it formally inaugurates “a new stage in the
process of European integration undertaken with the establishment of the European
Communities,” seemingly jettisoning the “economic” label, once and for all. Next, it
affirms the importance of “ending the division of the European continent” and expressed
the desire for “deepen[ing] solidarity between peoples,” while respecting their cultural
heritage.79
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After laying the foundation of idealism underpinning the formation of the EU, the
preamble gets down to brass tacks, explaining through what methods it will unite the
continent and preserve its culture. A first item referring to the EU machinery calls for a
single, federal institutional framework to “enhance further democratic and efficient
functioning of institutions.” A financial item proposes a monetary union under “a single
and stable currency” to streamline and unite members’ economies. A commercial item
calls for a common internal market spilling over into coordinated environmental policy,
followed by an item proposing a formal EU citizenship for residents (in addition to
national citizenship). The EU also proposes the formation of a common defense and
security policy “thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence,” as well
as a Shengen-like agreement facilitating the movement of people across the integrated
landscape. Finally, the preamble closes with a commitment by EU institutions to govern
directly over EU citizens, sharing sovereignty with the local national governments. This
last statement in the preamble charts a direct course away from intergovernmentalism,
and leaves national leaders with a strong commitment to supranationalism. 80 Following
the preamble, the former EEC is officially referred to as “the European Community” in
the remainder of the treaty. 81
Testing the EU
In many respects, with the norm of European Federalism firmly in place, the Treaty of
Maastricht seems as much an affirmation by the region to pursue unification as a
commitment to further economic integration. Since its implementation was largely
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economic (though its mandate was very political), my criteria fit the actual text of the
treaty only loosely. With this in mind, I suggest that Maastricht provided inspiration to
other EU agreements that are in many way more functional though less foundational. For
example, the implementation and expansion of the Shengen agreement over the years
impacted society in a real way by allowing Europeans to travel across the continent under
a single passport. Another example is the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) that provided for a
more reorganized and more democratic (and less intergovernmental) political process at
the federal level.
Creativity: Although the mechanics of the treaty were hashed out and then revised over
the years, the originality shines through in the Constructivist vision presented by Jacques
Delors.82 Delors advocated a Community that would be accountable, sovereign, effective
and a sum of Europe’s disparate parts. He acknowledged that realizing such a vision
called for reimagining the political world he and his contemporaries inherited, and
crafting a new one for themselves. The real originality lay in the way that the EU and
future members would collectively impact the international system, in the new political
model that they constructed at Maastricht.
Prescience: Maastricht was prescient in that it included frameworks for practical
progress in the short term (for achieving realistic objectives), but also approached longterm idealistic objectives. Because of the Federalistic enthusiasm, even among skeptical
states, Maastricht as a whole could be focused on the future far more than other
agreements.
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Responsiveness: In my opinion, this is the most inspiring attribute of the Maastricht
process. For more than ten years, serious challenges and doubts were expressed about
unification, particularly from the corner of the expansionists and intergovernmentalists.
Yet policy makers lent an ear to the skeptics, and either waited for more favorable
political conditions before moving forward or revised whole sections of the agreement in
order to win members’ approvals. In earlier treaties, this extreme flexibility might have
proven a liability, but in an era when European Federalism dominated as a norm,
integrationist leaders wisely used this wiggle room to make sure that an EU umbrella
could satisfy all its members.
Perspective: The road to Maastricht was very long, spanning not only years, but also
incorporating a number of preliminary summits and reports. Even following the signing
of the accord, ratification across member states proved an ordeal in and of itself, facing
ferocious competition in national capitals. Treaty framers were able to draw on the
hundreds of pages of reports, recommendations and deliberations to craft an agreement
that would keep the Community moving forward, even incrementally. With Federalism
as the established norm, and other European states from EFTA and the Iron Curtain
lobbying for membership, they were able to make accommodations to
intergovernmentalists with the realization that time was on their side. Judging by the
number of EU agreements in the wake of Maastricht, they were proved right.
Forward-thinking: In line with its originality, Maastricht was a first step toward a
politically unified region that changed the way that Europeans engaged with other parts
of the world. Powerful institutions across the common market made Europe a desirable
destination not only for states in the region not of the EU, but also for people seeking a
64

better life around the world. Additionally, the common currency as proposed by the
agreement, although ambitious, gave the world’s largest trading bloc a powerful financial
tool with which to move markets.
Big picture: Once again, the prevailing Federalist rhythm of European political life made
Maastricht most notable, in my opinion, for getting member states to sign on the dotted
line. It is true that it called for sweeping reforms and expansion of supranational
institutions, but most importantly it reinforced itself and the EU as the consensus center
of European political life. In its final form, it gave up much of its Federalist character in
exchange for accommodations to signatories. But it laid a groundwork for future
agreements, increased the political and economic prestige of the Community on the
international level, and inspired other nations across Europe to apply for accession and
“join the movement,” fulfilling an ideal put forth in the Treaty of Rome 35 years earlier.
By the time that Maastricht was signed in 1992, Constructivist influence permeated EC
thinking, especially through the commission president Jacques Delors. Constructivism as
a theory depends on societal norms and identity of the actor, as individuals and societies
possess the potential to shape their own environments, as opposed to being shaped almost
entirely by external forces, as per rational theories such as Realism and Liberalism. In the
latter two paradigms, actors must base their desires and strategies on previous
experiences and interests. However, Constructivist thinkers recognize social dynamics to
identify changing norms. To the Constructivist, tomorrow’s world is not bound by the
social limitations of today. New organization of politics and cooperation are always
possible. Imagining all Europeans as citizens with common rights, privileges and
identities, as well as reconstructing the roles of individual nation state.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
What does the future hold?
As the generation that successfully founded modern European integration fades away,
regional unity is in the hands of new leaders who face severe challenges. A few of the
major crises that have recently confronted EU states, and stoked division in Brussels,
include both external and internal pressures. For example, the Euro crisis, brought to the
fore by the global financial meltdown of the last decade, has tested Europe’s political
mettle, as members squabble over how to best implement fiscal stability across the union.
Additionally, the free movement of humans across the EU, from migrant laborers to
Syrian refugees, present logistical threats to the stability of the community. Finally,
Islamic terrorism strikes at the physical security and sustainability of European society
inside and out, as transnational militias from the Middle East export ideology, materiel
and soldiers, and those soldiers are often enlisted from among Europe’s own
disenfranchised nationals. All of these major pain points, as well as numerous other
issues, are the subjects of fevered debate between regional leaders, as member states
struggle to coordinate their corresponding national policies. In many ways, cultural
identities across the continent, national fears and aspirations alike, have been exaggerated
by these crises.
Assuming that European states resolve their differences peacefully, how will the outcome
impact the integration movement in Europe? Will the EU evolve by taking on greater
sovereignty at the federal level, binding the community tighter than ever before, as it did

66

in the Treaties of Paris and Rome? Or will it maintain the union by mollifying unhappy
members that seek to reclaim or protect sovereignty at the state level, as it did in the
aftermath of Maastricht? Both of these would be acts of preservation for EU leaders.
There is also a third unlikely possibility, in which unhappy states leave the union
altogether in order to pursue their own national interests and policies.
If history is any guide, EU members will find a way to arrive at a consensus with a mind
to resolving these crises. The previous 60 years have seen governments rise and fall and
policy regimes come and go. However, the European Union has only flourished, with
more states joining and more agreements affirming greater sovereignty at the federal
level. All the while, no member state has ever left the union and abandoned the dream of
integration, even as it bickered with its peers or wavered in its compliance with EU
policies. Margaret Thatcher, the British leader who personified the opposition to federal
sovereignty in the EC, described the new Europe as a “family of nations,” 83 evoking an
imagery of states bound together by a heritage thicker than water. In a biological and
social family, non-conformity and even non-compliance do not necessarily lead to
expulsion or defection. Perhaps this is so for political blood-relations as well, and part of
what Lady Thatcher wanted to convey through this allusion.
Resolving the economic crisis with integration theory
My thesis has presented the significant impacts of the theories of Functionalism,
Neofunctionalism and Federalism on regional integration, and the ways that they inspired
European states to pursue cooperation instead of competition. However, what theory of
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integration will provide the inspiration for European leaders to navigate the rapids
currently threatening peace and stability in the EU? Will one of these three theories
figure prominently over another, or will some other as yet unidentified paradigm present
itself?
It is possible that the current political climate is still heavily influenced by Federalism.
The importance for global financial markets of European economic integration, and
preservation of the common currency, is well established. The EU is still the world's
largest market,84 and one can imagine the numerous difficulties for both the union and a
defector state in stabilizing their markets should one decide to break away. Additionally,
with the Euro currency playing such an important role in capital markets, at times
appearing to rival even the almighty U.S. Dollar, a state in the European Monetary Union
leaving the agreement is, in my estimation, hardly more than a very compelling thought
experiment. On a political level, Europe is also bound rather tightly, though subtly.
States parties fly the EU flag outside their diplomatic missions abroad. Furthermore, on
many occasions, the EU negotiates or mediates political agreements and peace treaties,
reflecting a very broad common foreign policy among member states toward certain
situations.85 Additionally, EU agreements over the last ten years, most recently the
Treaty of Lisbon, have put more political sovereignty into the hands of supranational
organs, namely the directly elected European Parliament. Finally, the cultural,
transportation and commercial standards that are found throughout the EU will not be
easy to unravel overnight, should an angry member state choose to defect. In my
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opinion, these are all symptomatic of a powerful Federalist influence that continues to
prevail. States will stick with the EU because it is a powerful, important institution in
itself, sacred in its own right. The reality of an integrated Europe is too powerful a norm
to defy, and national interests must conform to accommodate compliance.
Perhaps a Neofunctionalist approach will help move the EU forward in the near future,
through the power wielded by supranational institutions. In this instance, a state
considering defection, or threatening to do so, might risk direct competition with the full
economic and political might of the region. Even nations in other parts of the globe,
which owe their health and prosperity to Europe's robust markets and commercial girth,
might steer clear of a defector. In some cases, Europe's supranational institutions actually
possess enough sovereignty to retaliate against a defector state, such as the extremely
influential European Central Bank and other regimes. In other words, even a state that is
unhappy or alienated from its peers in the EU will still opt to affirm its commitment to
membership, due to a Neofunctionalist need to settle its disputes in sovereign
supranational institutions.
It is also possible that the cycle of paradigms will come full circle, and see a return to
Functionalism to sustain regional integration, as it was during the era of Schumann and
Adenauer. States quarrelling over various matters of policy at the federal level, such as
with regards to bailout terms or other commercial benchmarks, might be able to overlook
political hotspots because they realize that coordination and cooperation is necessary.
Frustrated states would stay in the union, but not simply because of they are worried
about what the international community might think of them, nor because they fear the
EUs institutional power. If influenced by Functionalism, they will just accept that
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compromise is worth the cost of membership, since teaming up with other nations in the
region happens to be functionally effective.
Addressing the free movement and resettlement issues using the six criteria
My hypothesis is that successful regional integration in Europe, however gradual, was not
a spontaneous reaction to acute external pressures. Instead, it was the result of a shared
vision and clever planning by policy makers and negotiators, who never shied away from
addressing lofty ideals even as they attempted to resolve practical considerations. This
careful and sensitive balance that the founding fathers of the EU were able to strike, from
Schumann to Spaak to Delors and beyond, provided just the necessary formula to
convince states to surrender some of their jealously guarded sovereignty. As I argued,
the consensus agreements that they helped forge fulfilled a lengthy set of criteria, in
accordance with integration theory. If Europe’s leaders expect to be successful in
stewarding the integration movement toward a politically united continent, and
weathering the current storm of crises, I strongly suggest they abide by the same
guidelines.
For example, in the case of resolving the crises around the movement and resettlement of
people within the EU, an agreement should be:
Creative: Negotiators in Brussels could review the various disagreements and debates
around this issue, and identify the exact points where policy interests diverge. At these
cruxes, they should concentrate on suggesting original proposals that would either bridge
the gap directly between the disagreeing parties (such as an effective compromise) or
take the issue in a new direction entirely. As to the latter, parties need to recognize that
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divergent interests in one specific policy area do not presuppose disagreements in
another.
Prescience: Any successful agreement among member states should have considerations
or mechanisms built in, to anticipate and resist future pressures.A deal done only for
today might not last through tomorrow.
Responsiveness: Negotiators will be obliged to consider the reputations of themselves
and their constituencies as they hash out an effective agreement. Additionally, they must
consider the concerns and vulnerabilities of those who will be indirectly affected by the
agreement and account for those interests as well.
Perspective: When negotiating parties reach an impasse, they can consider building in
stronger (or weaker) shared institutions down the road in order to coax concessions today
from an insecure party.
Forward-thinking: A successfully negotiated settlement to maintain momentum towards
regional integration would not just focus on the immediate policy matter. It must also
utilize the language of idealism and reference the ultimate goal, as a legal witness to
remind states parties why they are cooperating in the first place. This will also provide
inspiration for future agreements.
Big picture: Any effective agreement will carefully consider opportunities and threats
beyond the immediate scope and geographical reach of the states parties. Considering
only the regional impact while ignoring the global effects would leave the agreement
vulnerable to unexpected attacks.
Seeking a common security policy to combat terrorism
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Terrorism, as perpetrated around the world by groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS, presents a
difficult challenge for polities like the EU and the United States. One reason is because of
the fluid and transnational nature of these armed groups’ members and organizations.
Frustratingly, ideology seems like the most critical export of these terrorist groups, a
commodity that is not so easily controlled by commercial regulation and border
agreements. In many instances, the terrorists themselves are homegrown citizens of the
targeted EU states. As a result, there is no military operation, bombing campaign or
sanctions regime that will neutralize the modern terrorist threat overseas. An effective
policy must be by parts unconventional and original, so that it addresses the ideological
and societal roots of the conflict in addition to carrying the threat of coercive force.
The EU is not a regular government, and does not have a sophisticated foreign policy or
particular defense/security apparatus shared among its member states. For the most part,
every EU member represents itself in security and defense matters. Coincidentally,
terrorism is not a regular security threat, and transnational terrorist groups are themselves
not regular armies or governments that can easily be targeted by policy campaigns.
Perhaps this uncomfortable symmetry would provide just the opportunity for member
states to formulate a consensus of foreign and security policy for the EU, at least with
respect to the Al-Qaeda and ISIS threats. The way in which the EU is a political
organization that spills over national borders and exerts a magnificent amount of
influence and power in global affairs might seem similar to the way that terrorist groups
do the same. Perhaps the secret to countering transnational but regionally focused groups
like Al-Qaeda and ISIS is through similarly amorphous, yet powerful and united, polities
like the EU.
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Though Europe is currently facing a number of serious crises, today’s leaders would do
well to remember the lessons of the last few decades, especially the one that meaningful
integration cannot be rushed or conceived out of thin air. As I demonstrated, every single
one of my cases was preceded by years of trial, error and extensive deliberation.
European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker recently remarked, in response to
the need for EU members to absorb Syrian refugees, “There is not enough Europe in this
union,” and “We have to change this now.” At the time of Juncker’s remarks, leaders of
Germany and France, the two core states of European integration, were reported as being
on board with the Commission’s assessment. “We need to change,” said German
Chancellor Angela Merkel. “And it won’t help to point fingers.”86 Whether or not
Europe can continue along the path to integration is, as we have seen in the run-up to my
three cases, independent of how member states adopt a common policy at the domestic
level. Instead, it is more about how inspired leaders embrace the vision of a united
European identity through shifting norms and patient negotiating. As long as Europeans
can trust each other for the long-run, history shows that policy-differences have little
chance of derailing the movement toward integration.
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